This paper provides evidence that managers have private information they exploit for …nancial gain at the expense of shareholders. It develops a model of optimal contracting to show that moral hazard, hidden actions taken by agents, can rationalize why a principal would optimally induce agents to bene…t from their private information.
I. Introduction
This paper provides evidence that managers exploit information hidden from shareholders for personal gain through their compensation contracts. We demonstrate this can arise as a part of an optimal arrangement between shareholders and managers, in a model where managers'actions are also hidden from shareholders and their board of directors, creating a moral hazard problem. We estimate a structural model of moral hazard that quanti…es its cost, and …nd that moral hazard from hidden actions is an important determinant of managerial compensation packages. So from a public policy perspective, one should not interpret evidence that managers bene…t from their insider information as indicative of failure in corporate governance. Optimal compensation plans may induce managers to bene…t from their private information, even if shareholders do not face public choice or free rider problems when aggregating their interests, and can easily communicate their wealth maximizing goal to managers through their board of directors.
The paper is organized around three questions. Are managerial compensation packages more likely to be tilted towards performance pay, such as dividends and capital gains from stock and options in the …rm, when their …rms subsequently perform well on the stock market? Can theory rationalize why shareholders would sanction this practice under some circumstances? The third question asks whether there are high economic bene…ts from shareholders creating incentives that align the manager's interests to theirs.
Based on evidence we provide in Section 2 from a longitudinal data set which tracks about 1500 U.S. …rms and their managers for nine years, we answer the …rst question in the a¢ rmative. Changes in the stock components of the manager's compensation package are a signi…cant variable in forecasting …nancial returns. One might interpret this empirical …nding as a trade-o¤ between higher net …nancial returns to shareholders and more risky …nancial packages for managers, but this implies some …rms do not maximize net …nancial returns. We are reluctant to drop the neoclassical premise that shareholders maximize the expected value of their …rm. We would rather interpret the a¢ rmative answer to the …rst question as evidence that managers have insider information, which helps them decide how much of their compensation package should be …xed and how much should be a¤ected by the …rm's performance.
Our preferred interpretation begs the second question. In Section 3 we develop a principal agent model in which moral hazard (or hidden actions taken by the agent) is a necessary condition to rationalize why the principal induces the agent to bene…t from their private information about the state of the …rm.
Unless moral hazard is an important empirical issue, it is hard to rationalize why shareholders would tolerate executives who bene…t from private information about the …rms they manage. Thus in Section 4 we answer the third question by estimating a structural model of moral hazard and …nd that the economic costs of ignoring moral hazard are indeed substantial.
There are many reasons why …rm executives are probably much better informed than shareholders about the prospects of the enterprise, and its demands on managerial time, energy and expertise. As opportunities to make the …rm more pro…table are explored, management gain foresight into which ventures are likely to be successful, and those which will probably fail, putting them in a favorable position to trade on their insider knowledge.
If a manager could choose how many …rm speci…c assets to hold without incurring penalties directed at those who engage in insider trading, he might prefer holding more stock and options in his own …rm when his private prognosis was more favorable than the market's, and less …rm speci…c assets when his insider knowledge projects a worse outcome than what stockholders and other investors think.
Insider trading is illegal, and the Securities and Exchange Commission is charged with combatting insider pro…ts from arbitrage.
1 But the SEC does not prevent a manager from 1 Harris (2003) describes how the SEC prepares to prosecute cases of alleged insider trading. Large volume transactions accompanied by big price shifts are a signal that information about the …rm's prospects may have been exploited by insiders. When alerted to a possible infringement (perhaps by a trader who believes he was exploited by an insider), the SEC compiles a list of investors who traded during the period under consideration, the insiders privy to information that led to the price change, and tries to match parties from both lists. bene…ting from insider information by holding more of his company's stocks when he believes his …rm's medium term prospects look more favorable than usual. Shareholders could prevent a manager from bene…ting from his detailed knowledge of his …rm. Existing regulations in the United States require the manager to frequently report all trading in the …rm's assets. Hence it would be a relatively straightforward for the board of directors to penalize the manager, and thus prevent him, from ever holding any of the …rm's assets. In the absence of moral hazard and/or the opportunity to bene…t from inside trading, it is hard to imagine why a manager would prefer to hold …nancial assets in his own …rm compared to the alternative of holding a well diversi…ed portfolio. Managers of nonpro…t enterprises and high ranking government o¢ cials are routinely required to divest themselves of assets that may cause a con ‡ict of interest between their professional role and personal wealth management. Therefore managers should have no more qualms about agreeing to such a requirement, than agreeing to rules governing company perks, or theft of company property.
Thus the board could greatly curb if not entirely eliminate the bene…ts managers garner for themselves from their inside information by issuing an easily enforced directive to their executive management.
In practice this never occurs. A large portion of executive compensation is tied to …rm speci…c assets. From an empirical standpoint, trading by corporate insiders appears to be pro…table. Seyhun (1986) …nds that insiders tend to buy before an abnormal rise in stock prices and sell before an abnormal decline. Earlier studies by Lorie and Niederho¤er (1968) , Ja¤e (1974), and Finnerty (1976) draw similar conclusions. More recently, Seyhun (1992a) …nds compelling evidence that insider trading volume, frequency, and pro…tability all increases signi…cantly during the 1980s. Over the decade, he documents that insiders earned over 5 percent abnormal returns on average. Seyhun (1992b) determines that insider trades predict up to 60 percent of the total variation in one-year-ahead returns. To summarize, hidden information is an economically important phenomenon in executive compensation.
So it is paradoxical that managers are compensated on the basis of their …rm's perfor-mance, such as dividends and capital gains, when the pro…tability of the …rm partly depends on how managers assess their own accomplishments and …rm's prospects. Bebchuk and Fried (2003) and others have argued that one reason why managers are paid stock options instead of assets that are easier to value, such as cash, is that shareholders systematically underestimate option expenses. Similarly Mullainthan (2000, 2001) argue that the separation of management from ownership in public corporations allows the CEO to gain e¤ective control of the pay-setting process. They argue that skimming is less likely to attract the attention of shareholders when the …rm performs well. Consequently granting options should be an excellent vehicle for skimming, costing shareholders nothing when the …rm performs poorly.
Such explanations are most convincing when there are costs of governance at the level of the board of directors from administering shareholder goals of maximizing …nancial returns.
However, the fact that managers receive restricted stock and options, which tie their personal wealth to the fortunes of their employers, does not signify governance problems at the board level. In principal agent models with hidden actions but no private information, shareholders could use these instruments to enforce the optimal contract. Margiotta and Miller (2000) develop econometric methods for estimating a structural model of moral hazard and …nd it is a very important factor for explaining variation in managerial compensation. Moreover using similar estimation methods, we …nd in Gayle and Miller (2008a) , that the structure of compensation, conditional on …rm characteristics, has been stable over the last 60 years.
That paper shows the secular increase in the mean and variance of managerial compensation is largely explained by the changing distribution of …rm size occurring throughout this extended period. Both studies are applied to relatively small data sets taken from only three industries, namely aerospace, chemicals and electronics. The empirical work on the costs of moral hazard reported in Section 4 extends these other results to a broad industry spectrum of publicly traded …rms.
II. Insider Wealth, Abnormal Returns and Compensation
This section addresses the …rst question raised in the introduction. After brie ‡y describing the longitudinal data set compiled for undertaking the empirical work, we conduct a regression analysis of the empirical evidence on the bene…ts of insider information. We focus on changes in stockholding that occur before the period begins to see whether they help predict future returns. Using a model with a simple linear decision rule for insider trading, we test whether managers condition on more information than the market does in forming their expectations about future returns. Regressing the manager's portfolio choices on next period's abnormal returns to the …rm, we …nd the latter are positive and signi…cant, evidence that future returns are a noisy indicator of inside information available to the manager.
We then conduct simulations in an attempt to quantify the magnitude of the gains to managers from their insider information. We construct a simple dynamic portfolio strategy based on changes in asset holdings by managers, and …nd that this strategy signi…cantly outperforms the market.
In the latter parts of Section 2 we investigate whether, conditional on the information held by the manager, compensation to managers ‡uctuates with the idiosyncratic components of the return to his …rm. After controlling for the manager's portfolio choices and other observed factors that a¤ect abnormal returns, we …nd that unexplained variation in abnormal returns is positive and signi…cant. This result supports the hypothesis that rather than simply bene…ting from their private information by structuring their compensation package in an advantageous way, managers are also motivated, through their work choices, to raise the mean of unanticipated abnormal returns. These new …ndings suggest a second explanation for why shareholders do not prevent managers from personally exploiting their insider knowledge about the …rm. If their actions are also hidden and a¤ect …rm performance, then not linking the manager's wealth to the …rm's value might create a moral hazard problem, an issue we take up in the sections which follow.
A. Data
Our analysis is based on longitudinal data gathered from three main sources 
No. of Observations 12470
Our data is similar to those used in Gayle and Miller (2008a) to investigate how managerial compensation has changed over the last sixty years. 3 Table 1 shows the average …rm size using three measures, sales, equity and assets. The standard deviations are about twice to three times as large as the sample means. We report two measures of income, the return on assets and abnormal returns. The latter are de…ned for the n th …rm at time t as x nt = nt t ; where t denotes the return on the market portfolio in period t and nt is the …rm's …nancial return. Thus x nt is a relative measure that uses stock market performance as a benchmark. We also experimented with other benchmark performance measures such as industry and sector returns, but they do not signi…cantly a¤ect the results reported below.
Note that measures of income are much more dispersed than the measures of …rm size with standard deviations about twenty times the respective sample means.
Total compensation and one of its components, pretax salary and bonus, are summarized in Table 2 . The other main components in executive compensation are stock and option grants, vested retirement bene…ts, as well as gains and losses from abnormal returns on stocks and other …nancial securities in the manager's portfolio. The reason for including the last component is that outsiders eliminate …rm speci…c risk by holding only a negligible amount of any given …rm's securities from their wealth portfolios, in this way guaranteeing the return on the market portfolio, rather a random variable distributed about that return.
Thus the fact each manager is so heavily vested in his own …rm indicates a professional interest that comes with his job. We report averages for the CEO, as well as the next …ve highest paid executives in the …rm, along with the respective standard deviations.
in exactly the same way as the data in this paper, but for a longer time period, namely 1992 through 2003 (as opposed to 2001), and for fewer executives only (the top 3 as opposed to the top 6). The second is a subset of the third, selecting only those observations from the third sample in the three industries mentioned above. Since the sample used in this paper is very similar to the third sample, we refer readers to a more detailed summary of the third sample provided in Tables 1 though 4 of our companion paper. 
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The main patterns in this data set are re ‡ected in many other samples of executive compensation. The CEO receives less than half of his compensation in salary and bonus, which exhibits much lower variability than the sum of the other components, both between and within industries or sectors. Lower ranked o¢ cers are paid less than CEOs and receive a higher proportion of their pay in salary and bonus.
B. Executive portfolio choices and future returns
If managers were more informed than the market and were able to exploit this information for personal gain, it seems reasonable to conjecture that the information impounded in future returns would help predict what choices managers had already taken with respect to their wealth portfolios. In that case abnormal returns would be a noisy predictor of ret-rospective choices. We now denote with a t subscript information available to stockholders at time t; and denote with a t + subscript information available to the managers at time t: We de…ne u n;t+ , the conditional expectation of the abnormal return at the beginning of period t + 1 based on all the information available to the manager in period t; as:
and denote by q n;t+ stock purchases by the manager in period t: De…ning: " n;t+1 x n;t+1 u n;t+ as the manager's forecast error of abnormal returns and (in this section only) assuming that the manager's decision rule for trading is linear in u n;t+ , it follows that:
where, by the de…nition of u n;t+ :
If we impose the additional restriction that 0 = 0; then this decision rule may be interpreted as a linear approximation to the optimal rule for a risk averse expected utility maximizer confronted with a favorable gamble. When 0 = 0 the rule implies that q n;t+ 0 if and only if u n;t+ 0: From the de…nition of u n;t+ , this is true if and only if E t+ [x n;t+1 ] and the unconditional expectation, E t [x n;t+1 ] = 0, are the same. In that case insider trading is conducted if and only if the manager has insider information about next period's abnormal return. Regressing q n;t+ on x n;t+1 we obtain a consistent estimator of:
The expression is positive if and only if 1 > 0:
The results from running this regression are reported in Table 3 . The coe¢ cient on lead abnormal return, 1 ; is positive and signi…cant in the sample as predicted by this simple model of insider information. Also consistent with the simple linear model 0 ; the constant term, is insigni…cant. In the same regression we also included the ratio of (contemporaneous) salary and bonus to total compensation to investigate whether the manager takes a lower salary and bonus in return for more claims that are contingent on the …rms'return. Although the sign of 2 is negative, it is not statistically signi…cant. The lack of signi…cance should not, however be interpreted as evidence against the model, since the manager is free to draw from his own outside wealth to invest in his …rms'stock when promising prospects arise. Managers are required to report all their trading activity to the SEC within a month, and their reports are available for public scrutiny. Consequently our …nding that managers appear to exploit inside information when investing in their own …rm raises the possibility that others might be able to bene…t from their serendipitous choices. Table 4 presents our …ndings from regressing abnormal returns on the manager's lagged trading activity, providing some evidence of how well their trading activity is a useful predictor of abnormal returns.
(Dummy variables for the sectors were also included in the regression, but are not reported here.) The estimated coe¢ cients in question are positive and signi…cant in both regressions, consistent with the hypothesis that managers exploit insider information. The estimates also show there is a negative relationship between abnormal returns of the …rm and the ratio of salary and bonus to total compensation, but again the relationship is statistically insigni…cant, reinforcing our earlier point that resources used for insider trading need not come at the expense of other components in the compensation package, but could simply re ‡ect an adjustment in the manager's asset portfolio. Much of the evidence from Tables 3 and 4 supports the notion that managers exploit their superior knowledge about their own …rm's performance on the stock market, but not all. As above, suppose the manager follows the linear decision rule for insider trading, and has access to the other regressors listed in Table 4 , which we now call z nt . In this case the inverse of the coe¢ cient on lagged changes in the manager's stock holdings is 1 , and the coe¢ cients values on all the other variables are zero because:
and the manager's forecast error satis…es the conditional expectation E [" n;t+1 jz nt ] = 0:
Hence, our …nding that several coe¢ cients are signi…cant, constitutes evidence against the linear model. We also note that an estimate of E " 2 n;t+1 can obtained by subtracting 1 from the product of the estimated coe¢ cient on x n;t+1 in Table 3 and the estimated coe¢ cient on q n;t+ in Table 4 . The estimated variance is negative, casting further doubt on the linear speci…cation.
C. Gains from insider trading
To gauge the magnitude of the gains from insider trading, we conducted a simulation exercise to retrospectively evaluate how lucrative it would have been to base a portfolio investment strategy on data from these reports over the 9 year period covered by the new data set. The simulations generated the outcomes of three self …nancing strategies. The …rst strategy is an outsider strategy, to invest in the market portfolio. The third strategy is only feasible if the inside investor perfectly anticipates the one period ahead abnormal return of the companies; an investor privy to perfect inside information pertaining to the n th …rm invests all his wealth in its shares in period t if n;t+1 > t+1 and all of it in the market portfolio if n;t+1 t+1 ; reaping a certain return for the period of:
Note there is an upper bound to the gains from perfect foresight because it is self …nancing strategy after the initial outlay.
The second strategy allocates a fraction of the manager's discretionary wealth, nt ; to the market portfolio in period t, and the remaining proportion (1 nt ) to stock in the n th …rm for a return of:
where nt re ‡ect the historical portfolio choices of the n th manager as observed in the data.
Here discretionary wealth is de…ned as the di¤erence between the maximum observed wealth observed the executive in the …rm observed over the sample period, denoted by W n ; and the minimum, denoted by W n . Thus nt is de…ned by:
We compared the outcomes of these three investment strategies, to see whether following the reports managers submit would have been pro…table, and how much of the potential gains from clairvoyance managers are able to extract. The market return averaged almost 1:089 per year in this period (with standard deviation 0:097), but if an executive could have perfectly anticipated returns in his own …rm, this number increases to 1:192 (with standard deviation 0:268). More surprising is our result that almost all these gains are realized by following the second strategy we de…ned, which produced an average annual return of 1:196
(with standard deviation 0:336). Note the standard arguments for diversi…cation imply that replicating the second portfolio strategy in each …rm would not have exposed investors to any idiosyncratic risk.
As a …nal check we investigated whether the cumulative gain from following these different strategies are statistically signi…cant from each other, by testing the null hypothesis:
for various (i; j) 2 f1; 2; 3g where
t is the market return and n 2 f1; : : : ; N g is the sample population of executives. The null hypothesis is strongly rejected for all the various combinations. To summarize, while perfect foresight beats everything, building an investment strategy based on the manager's stock holding is also signi…cantly more pro…table than specializing in the market portfolio.
D. Evidence for moral hazard
The evidence presented above favors the view that managers undertake insider trading, exploiting privy information to trade in their …rm's stock at the expense of shareholders.
We argued in the introduction that these activities are tacitly or explicitly approved by their respective boards of directors because insider trading by managers could be greatly curbed or even eliminated. Boards could require managers to refrain from owning …nancial assets of the …rms they manage. After all certain positions in the public sector, such as elected o¢ cers, require the occupant to divest himself of assets in …rms that might create a con ‡ict of interest between his professional duties and the incentives of the …rms'shareholders. One reason why boards might be reluctant to discourage insider trading is that compensation from insider trading might help align incentives between shareholders and the manager. If so, executive compensation packages might also depend on those components of abnormal returns that are not anticipated by inside knowledge.
Recall x n;t+1 is the abnormal return in the upcoming period t+1 and " n;t+1 is the residual of abnormal returns that the manager of …rm n does not anticipate. Let w n;t+1 denote his compensation paid at the beginning of the next period t + 1. If insider trading does not fully resolve the con ‡icts of interest between shareholder and management objectives, then the board of directors should make w n;t+1 depend positively on " n;t+1 :
Since " n;t+1 is unobserved, we regressed w n;t+1 on a estimate of " n;t+1 ; simultaneously controlling for other variables that managers use in forming their expectations about x n;t+1 :
Based on the identity: " n;t+1 x n;t+1 u n;t+ and recalling u n;t+ E t+ [x n;t+1 ] is his conditional expectation in period t about x n;t+1 ;
we formed:
b " n;t+1 x n;t+1 b u n;t+ from the estimated expectation function presented in Table 4 . Then we regressed w n;t+1 on b " n;t+1 as well as the variables used in estimating b u n;t+ : Our estimates in Table 5 show that managers are rewarded (punished) when the unanticipated component of abnormal returns is higher (lower) than they expected. This suggests that shareholders are not only less informed about the economic prospects of their …rm, but also that shareholders do not fully monitor the activities of their management. 
III. Generalized Moral Hazard
This section answers the second question using a principal agent model borrowed from Gayle and Miller (2008b) that analyzes interactions between insider information, moral hazard and executive compensation. We take up the idea that both insider information and moral hazard might play a role in contracting with managers. In our model shareholders do not observe the manager's activities. After paying the manager for his work in the previous period, at the beginning of each period the board of directors proposes a compensation plan to the manager, which depends on the realization of the …rms abnormal returns as well as accounting information to be later provided by the manager. Based on the board's proposal the manager decides whether to remain with the …rm or leave and picks real consumption expenditure for the period. Having accepted the contract o¤er, the manager observes the …rms prospects, provides some accounting information, and chooses a work routine that is not observed by the directors. The return on the …rms assets are realized at the end of the period. It depends on how well the …rm was managed during the period, the private information available to the manager, as well as other unanticipated factors.
The objective of the manager is to sequentially maximize his expected lifetime utility, and the goal of the …rm is expected value maximization. An optimal contract between shareholders and executives satis…es three conditions, a participation constraint, that assures the manager he will have higher expected utility from employment with his …rm rather than another one, an incentive compatibility constraint, that induces him to maximize the value of the …rm rather than using the resources of the …rm to pursue some other objective, and truth telling constraint that induces the manager to reveal his inside information. We show that absent moral hazard, the optimal contract is to pay the manager a …xed compensation irrespective of his private information. Furthermore, if insider information is not intrinsically linked to the moral hazard problem in a sense we make explicit, then although the optimal contract should depend on the …rm's abnormal returns, permitting the manager to exploit his nsider information is suboptimal. Finally, if moral hazard and private information are intrinsically linked, then the gains from private information can be incorporated into the optimal contract. Rather than discourage managers from bene…tting from their insider knowledge, the board might optimally sanction it.
A. The model
More speci…cally, at the beginning of period t the manager is paid compensation denoted w t for his work in period t 1 according to the schedule the shareholders had previously committed, and his managerial contract is up for renewal. He makes his consumption choice, a positive real number denoted by c t , and the board proposes a new contract. At that time the manager chooses whether to be engaged by the …rm or be engaged outside the …rm, either with another …rm or in retirement. Denote this decision by the indicator l t0 2 f0; 1g, where l t0 = 1 if the manager chooses to be engaged outside the …rm and l t0 = 0 if he chooses to be engaged inside the …rm. If l t0 = 0, the prospects of the …rm are then fully revealed to the manager but partially hidden to the shareholders.
We assume throughout that managers privately observe s t 2 f1; 2g in period t; information that a¤ects the distribution of the …rm's abnormal returns. The board announces how managerial compensation will be determined as a function of s choice, denoted by l tj 2 f0; 1g for j 2 f1; 2g in each period t. There are two possibilities, to work diligently for the …rm by pursuing the shareholders objectives of value maximization, and indicated by setting l t2 = 1; or to be employed by the …rm but shirk, following di¤erent objectives than maximizing the …rm's value, and here denoted by l t1 = 1.
At the beginning of the period t + 1 abnormal returns x t+1 for the …rm are drawn from a probability distribution which depends on the true state s t and the manager's action l t . We denote the probability density function for abnormal returns in period t when the manager works diligently and the state is s by f s (x t+1 ) ; and let f s (x t+1 ) g s (x t+1 ) denote the probability density function for abnormal returns in period t when the manager shirks, bounded below by the same real number . Note that g s (x) is the likelihood ratio for abnormal returns from shirking versus working diligently in state s. We assume that the …rm's losses from shirking do not depend on the state, meaning f 1 (x) g 1 (x) f 2 (x) g 2 (x).
Consequently higher pro…ts from being in the better state can only be realized if the manager is diligent.
Preferences over consumption and work are parameterized by a utility function exhibiting absolute risk aversion that is additively separable over periods and multiplicatively separable with respect to consumption and work activity within periods. Lifetime utility is expressed as:
where is the constant subjective discount factor, is the constant absolute level of risk aversion, and j is a utility parameters with consumption equivalent 1 log ( j ) that measures the distaste from working at level j 2 f0; 1; 2g. We assume 2 > 1 meaning that compared to the activity called shirking, diligence is more aligned to the shareholders' interest than the manager's interests, and without loss of generality scale utility so that 0 = 1. This simply means that j values the nonpecuniary features of engaging in activity j 2 f1; 2g within the …rm relative to the total current utility value from leaving the …rm.
The manager's wealth is endogenously determined by his consumption and compensation. We assume there are a complete set of markets for all publicly disclosed events, e¤ectively attributing all deviations from the law of one price to the market imperfections under consideration.
B. The optimal contract
Drawing upon the work of Fudenberg, Holmstrom and Milgrom (1990) , we can show that the optimal long term contract solved by shareholders can be implemented by a sequence of short term contracts. Appealing to Myerson (1982) , the revelation principle implies that, without loss of generality, we can restrict the set of feasible contracts to those that respect the participation, incentive compatibility and truth telling constraints we now de…ne. The participation constraint states that the manager prefers working one more period and then leaving to not working for the …rm at all. The incentive compatibility constraint restricts short term contracts to those payment schedules in which the manager prefers to work diligently rather than shirk. The truth telling condition requires shareholders to write contracts that induce the manager to select a compensation schedule that reveals the …rm's prospects.
We assume throughout that legal considerations induce the manager not to overstate the …rm's prospects but that incentives must be provided to persuade the manager from understating them.
This leads to the following formulation of the optimization problem shareholders solve, to maximize:
; which measures how utility is scaled up by compensation if abnormal returns x are realized at the end of the current period t when state s is announced, where b t+1 is the bond price at t + 1; while 0 is the shadow value of relaxing the participation constraint, 1 and 2 are the shadow values for relaxing the incentive compatibility constraints, and 3 is the shadow value of relaxing the truth telling constraint. The …rst order conditions for this problem are:
where h(x) ' 2 f 2 (x) =' 1 f 1 (x) and ' s denotes the probability the state is s: It is straightforward to show that 0 = 1=(bt 1) 2
: If the truth telling constraint is not binding, then 3 = 0 and the optimization problem reduces to the pure moral hazard problem solved in Margiotta and Miller (2000) . Otherwise 3 > 0; and we substitute the …rst order condition into the incentive compatibility and truth telling constraints, yielding the following system of three equations to solve for the remaining three unknowns 1 ; 2 ; and 3 :
The …rms solves similar maximization problems for two of the remaining combinations of e¤ort level, shirking in the …rst state but working diligently in the second, shirking in the second but not the …rst, and selects the value maximizing contract.
If there is moral hazard, it is easy to see from the …rst order conditions that compensation varies with the …rm's abnormal returns, exposing the manager to uncertainty. Consequently the …rm must pay a risk premium to meet the participation constraint if his compensation is uncertain and depends on the …rm's abnormal returns, because the manager is risk averse.
Absent moral hazard, the optimal compensation is a …xed wage award of:
for working at e¤ort level j; which just o¤sets the alternative use of his time. Setting j = 1
gives the shirking contract. A rule prohibiting any trading in the …rm stock is optimal in this case, and can easily be implemented if the manager's trades are publicly disclosed.
More generally, the compensation schedule should not depend on the manager's private information if, conditional on the manager's e¤ort, the distribution of abnormal returns is independently distributed of the state. To prove this second claim, consider a model where there is only one state, by setting ' 2 = h (x) = 0: Let w (x) denote the optimal contract for the one state model where 1 is the associated multiplier for the incentive compatibility constraint. Now suppose ' 2 6 = 0 but assume f 1 (x) = f 2 (x) instead. For example the states might be revealed to the manager after he has committed to his e¤ort level but before the end of the period when abnormal returns are realized. In this case he would still personally bene…t from insider trading if he was permitted. By assumption, the shirking distributions are the same in both states, meaning
so it now follows that g 1 (x) = g 2 (x) : Hence, upon inspection of the …rst order conditions and the solution equations for the multipliers, w (x) is also the optimal contract for the specialization f 1 (x) = f 2 (x) ; and is supported by the multipliers 1 = 1 = 2 with 3 = 0:
This demonstrates the manager should not be compensated for his hidden information in this case. Unless it is intrinsically tied to the moral hazard problem of motivating them to work diligently, in this model managers should not be allowed to trade on their inside information.
Finally if 3 > 0; meaning the truth telling constraint is binding, it follows from arguments in Gayle and Miller (2008b) , that the manager is paid more on average in the second state than he would be in the pure moral hazard case, and less in the …rst state. Intuitively shareholders must bribe the manager to truthfully reveal the second state when they cannot observe it directly, in order to incentivize his e¤ort. However this gain is o¤set by a penalty paid in the …rst state, because competition amongst executives for the position before the state is revealed equalizes their expected utility to the level attained in the pure moral hazard case. The optimal contract exposes managers to uncertainty from two sources, namely the state s, and conditional on the state, the draw of the abnormal return x. Thus the additional uncertainty increases the expected cost of the compensation package to shareholders for the higher risk premium.
IV. Estimating the Costs of Moral Hazard
Our model in Section 3 demonstrates the manager does not pro…t from an increase in the value of the …rm if he signs an optimal contract unless there is a moral hazard problem.
As we remarked in the introduction, the disclosure rules of the SEC make it relatively easy for boards to write contracts with managers that prohibit any trading in the …rm's securities.
Yet the reduced form empirical evidence reported in Section 2 shows that managers bene…t signi…cantly from their …rm's good fortune. Although linking pay to performance can be rationalized within theoretical models of optimal contracting with moral hazard and hidden actions, the practical relevance of moral hazard to managerial compensation is ultimately an empirical phenomenon, the nub of the third question in the second paragraph of the introduction. Given the risks that insider trading pose for shareholders, is moral hazard a su¢ ciently important economic factor for …rms to incentivize managers?
In this section we estimate the structural parameters of a pure moral hazard model, and compute the costs and bene…ts to shareholders from incentivizing managers. Our empirical analysis applies nonlinear estimation techniques for parametric models of optimal contracting developed in Margiotta and Miller (2000) and Gayle and Miller (2008a) . A companion paper, Gayle and Miller (2008b) , analyzes identi…cation, testing and estimation in nonparametric optimal contracting models where there is both moral hazard and private information. Here we apply parametric methods to a broad industry spectrum of publicly traded …rms, thus extending the earlier applications of Margiotta and Miller (2000) and Gayle and Miller (2008a) on smaller data sets to a few select industries. Our new estimates corroborate the earlier work, by showing the estimated losses …rms would incur by paying executives a constant wage are much greater than the relatively small amount we estimate shareholders currently pay to incentivize them.
A. Parameterizing the model
There are …ve parameters to account for systematic di¤erences in executive compensation. They are the probability distribution of abnormal returns conditional on working,
; the probability distribution of abnormal returns conditional on shirking, f (x) g (x) ; the risk aversion parameter, ; the nonpecuniary bene…t from shirking versus working, captured by parameter ratio 2 = 1 ; and the nonpecuniary bene…t of working versus retiring or accepting employment outside the …rm, 2 .
Our empirical analysis assumes f (x) and f (x) g (x) are truncated normal with support bounded below by ; where ( 2 ; 2 ) and ( 1 ; 2 ) respectively denote the mean and variance of the parent normal distributions. Thus:
and:
where is the standard normal distribution function. As indicated in the previous section, we cannot reject the null hypothesis of restricting the mean of abnormal returns to zero conditional on working in the data, a restriction we impose in the estimation of the parameter ratio of nonpecuniary bene…ts from working to shirking 2 = 1 ; and the ratio of nonpecuniary bene…ts from working to quitting 2 = 0 ; to estimate.
The parameters of the distribution of returns are estimated separately for each sector, whereas the taste parameters 2 = 1 and 2 are speci…ed as mappings of executive rank. To accommodate other factors that might a¤ect compensation not included in the model we assumed that total compensation, denoted e w t ; is the sum of optimal contract compensation w t plus an independently distributed disturbance term " t ; assumed orthogonal to the other variables of interest. Loosely speaking, the reported values represent the abnormal return that trigger delisting from the exchange. Our estimates suggest the points at which creditors instigate bankruptcy proceedings, are bought by private investors, or are amalgamated, di¤er by sector, but are dispersed around the value where the equity value of the …rm is close to zero.
B. Parameter Estimates
Since the di¤erence between the …rm's …nancial returns and the return on the market is identically the abnormal return it follows that if the return on a diversi…ed portfolio was r;
then an abnormal return of r would reduce shareholder value to zero, and we previously noted the return on the market portfolio over this period was 1:089. In Tables 7 and 8 we report estimates of the three remaining parameters ( 1i ; 2i ; i ) that de…ne the truncated normal distribution for each sector i 2 f1; 2; : : : ; 10g : As indicated in the previous section, we cannot reject the null hypothesis of restricting the mean of abnormal returns to zero conditional on working in the data, a restriction we impose in the estimation equations. This explains why 2i is, without exception, negative and signi…cant. The theory predicts that the support for abnormal returns distribution conditional on shirking is contained in the support for abnormal returns conditional on working diligently.
Otherwise a …rst best contract could be achieved by paying the manager a …xed wage supplemented with a su¢ ciently high …ne whenever abnormal returns stray into the region outside the latter, obviating the need for incentive pay that at best can produce a second best contract. In our empirical speci…cation, the two supports are the same, and they share a common sector speci…c parameter, i , di¤ering only in the mean of the parent distributions, 1i and 2i : Thus the mean of the truncated distribution for shirking is less than the mean of the truncated distribution for working diligently if and only if 1i < 2i : Our estimates con…rm this is the case in every sector, as Table 8 shows.
Abnormal returns in the health sector behave very di¤erently than the others; although its lower truncation point is the same order of magnitude as in the other sectors, a very low 26 coupled with a very high 6 imply the probability density function for abnormal returns in that sector is estimated to be very ‡at so that it can capture some high returns that occurred in some …rm/years. Similarly our estimate of 1i is orders of magnitude lower than the counterparts for the other sectors, signifying an even ‡atter density for the shirking distribution.
The preference parameter estimates are presented in Table 9 . Our estimate of ; the risk aversion parameter, implies utility is concave increasing as required by the model, and lies between results in reported in Margiotta and Miller (2000) and Gayle and Miller(2008a) . It implies that a manager would be indi¤erent between accepting a lottery o¤ering even odds of winning or losing one million dollars versus losing an amount of $103; 259 for sure. Our estimate of ; the parameter explaining variation not captured by the model, is similar too.
(More precisely, the variance of the measurement error is 2b t+1 2 :)
We estimated 2 ; the parameter determining competitive opportunities in the labor market for executives, and 2 = 1 ; a measure of nonpecuniary bene…ts from shirking versus working diligently, by executive position for the top six ranked executives. All our estimates of 2 are greater than one numerically, but only in the upper ranks is the null hypothesis that 2 = 1 rejected in favor of the one sided alternative 2 > 1. Recalling that the exponential utility function is negative, these results are weak evidence that the nonpecuniary bene…ts of the job relative to outside opportunities in the labor market, decline with promotion.
It appears that …nancial remuneration, rather than power, prestige or perks, is necessary to motivate executives to climb the corporate ladder. Our estimates of 2 = 1 show that chief executive o¢ cers would bene…t signi…cantly from taking actions that are not in the shareholder's interests if they are not incentivized, whereas the opportunities a¤orded to lower ranked executives if their pay is not tied to performance are more limited, presumably because discretion about work activities and job duties increase with rank while the degree of supervision declines. These issues are investigated more thoroughly in Gayle, Golan and Miller (2008) , who estimate the dynamic life cycle aspects of executive promotion and turnover. 
C. The Costs of Moral Hazard
We characterize the importance of moral hazard three ways, the gross loss shareholders would incur before accounting for managerial compensation from the manager tending his own interests, the bene…ts accruing to the manager from tending his own interests instead of his shareholders, and how much the shareholders are willing to pay to eliminate the problem of moral hazard altogether. Utilities 569
The …rst measure, denoted 1 ; is the expected gross output loss to the …rm switching from the distribution of abnormal returns for diligent work to the distribution for shirking, which has probability density function f (x) g (x). Stated di¤erently, 1 is the di¤erence between the expected output to the plant from the manager pursuing the …rm's goals versus his own, before netting out expected managerial compensation:
where V is the equity value of the …rm, this formula exploiting the identity that the expected value of abnormal returns is zero when the manager pursues the interests of the …rm. Table   10 displays the estimated average over all …rms in each sector for withdrawing the incentives for the managers to work diligently. Comparing these numbers with the size of …rms reported in Table 3 , we …nd that the value of equity would decline precipitously if managers were not incentivized to align their personal objectives with those of the …rms they manage. This result essentially replicates the …ndings of Margiotta and Miller (2000) and Gayle and Miller (2008a) for a much smaller select group of narrowly de…ned industries (aerospace, chemicals and electronics).
The second measure, 2 ; is the nonpecuniary bene…ts to management from ongoing shirking, that is successive managers pursuing their own goals within the …rm each period.
Suppressing the time subscript, and supposing that the bond price b is constant, let w 2 denote the manager's reservation wage to work under perfect monitoring or if there were no moral hazard problem, that is his certainty equivalent of the current compensation package, and let w 1 denote the manager's reservation wage to shirk. Then the present value of the compensating di¤erential for these two activities, can be expressed as the di¤erence 2 b (w 2 w 1 ) :
Our estimates of 2 for the top executive position is $24; 690; 192; for the second in command $4; 460; 774, tiny compared to the expected losses a …rm would incur; our model predicts there are enormous gains from having managers act in the interests of shareholders. (Estimates of the lower ranked executives are considerably lower than for the second in command.) From the manager's perspective, however, the annuity implied by 2 is quite substantial, and for a sizeable proportion of the sample population exceeds annual compensation. Of course if a manager decided to shirk to receive these sizable nonpecuniary bene…ts then his expected compensation would fall drastically because his inside wealth would lose much of its value.
Finally we estimated the maximal amount shareholders are willing pay to eliminate the moral hazard problem, the value of a perfect monitor, 3 . Absent moral hazard, the …rm would pay the manager the …xed wage w 2 , instead of according to the compensation schedule w (x) : Another way of expressing 3 is the equilibrium risk premium paid to an executive for taking a job that o¤ers an uncertain income. The …rms'willingness to pay for eliminating the moral hazard problem for one period is therefore 3 E [w (x)] w 2 : We computed this measure for the CEO and second highest paid executive for each sector.
4 Table 11 Cost Con…rming our previous work, the estimates in Table 11 demonstrate that the risk premium paid to executives is a very important part of their pay package. Elsewhere we have argued, in Gayle and Miller (2008b) , that changes in this component are largely responsible for expected compensation and its volatility, increasing faster than real wages over the last 60 years. Here we simply add that there is notable variation between the costs of moral hazard across the sectors, with the health care sector registering as an outlier worthy of special attention in a future study.
V. Conclusion
The disclosure rules of the SEC make it relatively easy for boards to write contracts with managers that prohibit any trading in the …rm's securities. Yet our empirical evidence shows that managers signi…cantly bene…t from their …rm's good fortune. Consistent with previous work, in this area we …nd that managers exploit insider information about the pro…tability of their own …rm for direct personal gain. But this is not su¢ cient to prove that executive compensation contracts are de…cient. Our theoretical framework demonstrates that in an optimal contract the manager should not pro…t from changes in the value of the …rm unless there is a moral hazard problem. This feature might explain the paradox of inside information and performance pay. Optimal contracting in models of generalized moral hazard, with both private information and hidden actions, reward managers for truthfully revealing the state of the …rm. Shareholders permit compensation schemes that correlate …rm performance with executive pay because the pro…tability of the …rm depends on how managers assess their own accomplishments and …rm's prospects, as well as what managers do, which is organizing human resources in creative ways that add value to their …rm. Rewarding managers for revealing hidden information about the …rm's pro…tability helps the board set contracts that incentivize the manager's work activities. If moral hazard is anywhere near as costly as our estimated values, then de-coupling managerial compensation from changes in shareholder wealth, for example by imposing an upper limit on maximal compensation, could be very costly indeed.
